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INTRODUCTION
Thepresentinstrumentsof safetyandreliability risk controlfor amajority of theNational
Aeronauticsand SpaceAdministration(NASA) programs/projectsconsist of Failure Mode and
EffectsAnalysis(FMEA), HazardAnalysis(HA), Critical Items List (CIL), and HazardReport
(HR). This extensive analytical approach was introduce in the early 1970's and was
implemented for the Space Shuttle Program by N!-IB 5300.4 (1D-2. Since the Challenger
accident in 1986, the process has been expanded considerably and resulted in introduction of
similar and/or duplicated activities in the safety reliability risk analysis. A study initiated in
1995, to search for an alternative to the current FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis methodology
generated a proposed method on April 30, 1996. The objective of this Summer Faculty Study
was to participate in and conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed alternative to
simplify the present safety and reliability risk control procedure.
SAFETY/RELIABILITY RISK CONTROL METHODS
Present Method: The present method uses analysis and reporting in two phases. The
analysis for hardware failures are documented in FMEA and critical items based on FMEA is
reported in CIL. The analysis for hazards are documented in HA. The Hazard Report is
prepared on the basis of HA and CIL report.
Proposed Method: The proposed method integrates all analysis in a single phase
documenting in Risk Analysis and a single report for all potential critical failures and other
hazards in Risk Management Report (RMR). The method fosters a comprehensive analysis
rather than the present compartmentalized one.
APPROACH OF THE STUDY
The evaluation approach has been to review the four basic risk control documents -
FMEA, CIL, HA and HR for their functions, data elements contained in them, analytical process
required to develop these, document user friendliness, and the effects of project characteristics.
ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE
Functions of the basic document: FMEA and HA are both analytical documents. The
FMEA contains information on failure modes/causes excluding some environmental and human
factor causes while HA deals with all hazards including critical failures, environmental and
human factor causes. Both these two have a number of common data and are suitable for
integration to eliminate duplication and/or compartmentalization of thought process. Similarity
CIL and HR are both reports based on analysis done in developing FMEA and HA. These are
suitable for integration to eliminate duplication of common data elements, and cross referencing
between CIL and HR.
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Data Elements of the basic document: The documentsFMEA/HA, CIL/HR vary
significantly dependingon the project size, complexity and nature. The contentsof the
documentsareof thefollowing types:
• Introductory/identification
• Analytical
• Analysis support
• Review and approval
Integration of the analysis and reports is expected to reduce number common/similar data
in integrated documents by about 20 to 30 percent as shown in table 1 and 2.
Table 1
Number of Data Elements in Analysis Document(s)
Present Method Proposed Method
FMEA H__A_A Total RA Total
Introductory 4 4 8 4
Analytical 9 8 17 13
Support Data 5 4 9 7
Review/Approval 1 1 _ 1
Total 36 25
Data elements reduced from 36 to 25 (30.6%)
Table 2
Number of Data Elements in Report(s)
Present Method Proposed Method
CIL HR Total RMR Total
Introductory 4 4 8 6
Analytical 8 8 16 13
Support Data 4 1 5 4
Review/Approval 2 2 _ 2
Total 33 25
Data elements reduced from 33 to 25 (24.4%)
Analytical Process: The present method of separating failure mode effect analysis
(FMEA) and hazard analysis (HA) introduces duplication and compartmentalization in the
thought process. There is a possibility of incomplete analysis due to responsibility of partial
analysis assigned to different groups. To complete the hazard analysis, the safety group has to
obtain hardware failure mode/cause data from the FMEA group requiring coordination and/or
occasional duplication of analysis due to scheduled milestones. In addition, the proposed method
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of documentationhas scopeof simplificationresulting in fastercomphehensionat lesseffort.
For example,key informationcanbesummarizedin a tabularformat for a hypotheticalcaseof
"PrematureReleaseBolt Failure"that is currentlycontainedin threeseparateCILs anda Hazard
Reportwhich containsfour additionalhazards. Thekey informationwould include the critical
failures/hazards,critical items identification,numberof items required, critical/hazard effect,
failure/hazardcauses,singleand redundantfailure identification, criticality categories,severity
levels, likelihood of occurrence,and hazardclassiftcation..This would provide the user key
informationabouta critical eventwithout havingto searchfour different reports. Useractivities
like planning test/inspectionpoints,verifying redundancy,certification of flight readiness,life
extensionof hardwareetc. at various phasesof a project life. The improved presentation,
reductionof cross-referencing,reductionof numberof documentsto dealwith will resultin less
usereffort for higherproductivity for theprojectasawhole.
Userfriendliness/crossreferencing:Thepurposedintegrationof analysisandreportswill
reducetheneedof crossreferencingto asignificantextent. Two casesof SpaceShuttleProgram
studied,indicatedthat the FMEA and/orCIL are referencedon anaverageof twenty-two times
for eachCIL or five timesfor eachfailurecause.Theneedof somuchcrossreferencingbetween
theCIL
and HR, imposinga significantamountof time andeffort on analyst,will be eliminatedin the
integratedsystem.
DocumentRetention,Storage,andRetrieval: Theproposedintegratedsystemwill reduce
the numberof documentsto retain,store,andretrieveand assuchreducethe time requiredfor
assessmentof safetyandreliability risksin aprogram/project.
Effect of Project characteristics: The nature of size of a project will effect the risk
managementprocesssignificantly. A largeandcomplexproject will requireextensiveanalysis
while a small andsimplerprojectmayrequireonly environmental/humanerror type hazardsand
no critical failure type hazards. This differencewill result in substantiallymore savingsfor a
largerproject. Howeverthe integratedapproachwill resultin somesavingsin all cases.
MERITS OFTHE PROPOSEDMETHOD
The proposedmethodappearsto haveseveraladvantagesover the current procedureas
listedbelow:
• Focuson a singleandintegratedanalysisprocessinsteadof the presentcompartmentalized
system is likely to produce more comprehensivesafety/reliability risk analysis. The
integrationwill eliminatethepossibilityof critical situationsbeing left out of analysisdue to
partialwork doneby eachgroup.
• Integratedrisk analysisand reportingprocesswill greatly reducethe coordination required
now betweentwo groupsFMEA/CIL andHA/HR.
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• Duplication of commondataelementswill be eliminatedin the analysisaswell as in the
reportingdocuments.This will reducethevolumeof reportsandresultin a reductionin the
effort requiredto reviewandcomprehendthe safety/reliabilityrisk status.
• The possibility of occasionalduplicationof analysisdue to different time constraintsfor
differentgroupswill alsobeeliminated.
• All safety/reliability risk datawill be submittedsimultaneouslyfor review and approvalto
appropriateauthorities.This will eliminateduplicationof review/approvalprocess.
• A more effective documentation method (e.g. tabuiar format, etc.), will improve
comprehensionof the statusat a glanceand reducethe frequentreferencingto pagesof
multiple documents.
• Recording,storing,and maintaininga significantly lower volume of documentsduring the
life timeof aprogramwill result in aconsiderablylargesavingsin manpowerandcost.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the substantial merits of the proposed integrated system over the present
FMEA/HA and CIL/HR, the following recommendations are made:
• Develop the final formats for:
• Risk Analysis Worksheet, and
• Risk Management Report
• Continue to develop requirements and guidelines detailing method to follow with clear
defmitions of limits for analysis and reporting.
• Continue the independent and concurrent evaluation, as continuation of the Summer
Research Program (1996) of The University of Alabama during the development of the
proposed risk management system.
• Conduct a test run and/or parallel run of the proposed method, preferably for an in-house
project.
• Debug the weak points from the system, on the basis of the test/parallel run.
• Arrange for orientation of the analysts in the proposed integrated process.
• Implement the proved-in integrated system of safety/reliability risk analysis for the future
programs/projects.
COMMENTS
The present evaluation study covered only the basic thought process and the development
of documentation required to support the system. The proposed system does not exclude any
analytical technique e.g. checklists, fault trees, but propose to use these as required in a cost
effective way. The indication of savings at this stage (20 to 40 %) is approximate but savings
will result from integrated thought process, improvement in documentation format, reduction of
volume and number of documentation, and reduced effort for users at various phases of a project
life.
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